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Abstract 
During the last decades energy sector has undergone thoughtful structural changes, 
getting towards a more competitive environment, a process that it is highly controlled 
and monitored by regulatory authorities. The differences in the pace and extent of 
market reforms are mainly related to the starting point of each reform and the 
problems associated with the internal environment of the market. The applied 
theoretical and analytical contributions provide guidance to policy-makers and 
government officials in designing new policy scenarios for the investigation of the 
role of competition in the energy sectors. The empirical contributions provide 
evidence to support and inform current policy debates and should be of benefit to 
policy-makers and researchers worldwide.  
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1. Introduction 
Energy policy is an emerging and very intense topic in the field of 
environmental and economic research. A major issue that arises in many recent 
studies is that of competition in the energy sector. Until the 90s, the energy sector 
(electricity, natural gas, oil) in most of the European Union (EU) countries was 
vertically integrated and state-owned. In relation to the situation in Europe, there are 
still concerns regarding the competition of EU member countries especially about 
natural gas, whereas the reserves are concentrated and the number of suppliers are 
limited (Hulshof et al., 2016).  
Competition policy is rather complex therefore the associated law and 
regulations too; much has been written regarding law and economics but not 
regarding the overall policy assessment (Wilks, 2010). Energy law scholarship      
demands interdisciplinary insights. The complexities of the interaction between 
different energy sources and the relevant decision making have been studied by many 
researchers such as Heffron and Talus (2016).  
Energy law, a still quite new area of law is an emerging topic nowadays and 
includes governing energy-related matters and the management of energy resources 
(Heffron, 2015). Some important topics of energy law include: market liberalization, 
environmental issues, climate change, antitrust and state aid rules (Samkharadze, 
2019). Policy makers have to suggest policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and increase energy security.1 According to Brown and Huntington (2008) the optimal 
policy is performed when the cost of the additional use of each method is equivalent 
to the value of additional energy security and the resulting reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions.  
 Almost two decades since the opening of the European electricity and gas 
markets to competition and despite the obvious delays and malfunctions in the 
European Commission’s strategic plan for energy, there are some encouraging signs 
that the energy market is slowly but steadily moving towards market integration and 
                                                             
1 For policy implications on climate change see among others Halkos and Paizanos (2016), Halkos et 
al. (2018), for institutions see Evangelinos and Halkos (2002) and Halkos and Evangelinos (2002), for 
environmental behaviour Gkargkavouzi et al. (2019) and for optimization and pollution control see 
Halkos (1995, 1996, 2003).  For issues in Econometrics see Halkos (2006, 2007, 2019).  
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liberalization. Latest evidence show market coupling and price convergence for a 
series of major power markets and gas hubs especially in the North Western European 
region, with consumers having a variety of available providers to choose from, hence 
a high percentage of switching rates and an increasing number of market offers.  
Specifically, in 2017 almost 6 million household electricity consumers and 
more than 5.5 million household gas consumers made use of a market offer (Council 
of European Energy Regulators, 2018). Tulloch et al. (2018) further confirm the 
increase in European energy market competition, as they discovered a continuous 
declining trend in the electricity and gas utilities’ returns for over a 17 year period, 
suggesting that the markets are becoming more competitive. Similarly, concerning the 
USA and according to Brown (2017) from the mid-1990s to early 2009 the U.S. 
natural gas prices were quite similar to world oil prices but they are a lot lower since 
2009 due to technological change that was considerably greater than before the supply 
of U.S. shale gas resources. 
Here we concentrate in the issue of competition in the energy sector paying 
attention to competition and innovation, energy law and the role of Asian markets in 
the energy mix and energy security. In the next section we discuss the issue of 
liberalization in the energy sector while in the third section we consider the main 
issues around competition. The last section concludes the paper concentrating in the 
studies of the special issue and their main findings that will assist researchers and 
policy makers.  
2. Energy sector liberalization 
Competition enhances consumer welfare and ensures the allocation of 
resources efficiently (Kroes, 2005). According to Painuly (2001) the term energy 
sector liberalization includes measures aiming at the restructuring of the energy 
sector, the introduction of competition and the removal of other controls. These 
measures include among others the following:  
 Creation of separate entities for generation and distribution in the electricity 
sector. 
 Entry of private sector companies. 
 Removal of controls on energy pricing, fuel use, fuel import, capacity expansion 
etc. 
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 Institutional measures such as specialized regulatory bodies.  
Even though these regulations are in place, markets are mainly national with 
few cross-border trade, therefore the EU Commission has paid great attention into 
controlling potential mergers (such as the proposed merger between EDP and GDP in 
Portugal), into setting up rules for mergers and in controlling state aid to energy 
companies across the EU (European Commission, 2012). The efficacy of those 
regulations and mechanisms is hindered by conflicts between different national 
jurisdictions and sector interests (Eberlein, 2008). In more detail, it is necessary to 
have a common EU competition policy, mainly to achieve low prices for all, better 
quality, more choice, innovation (in product design, production techniques, services) 
and better competition potential in global markets (European Commission, 2015). 
Therefore it is essential to integrate national markets into a single European 
one; such an integration depends highly on the physical infrastructure available that 
can be used (Spiridonova, 2016). In many EU countries infrastructure for energy and 
gas is still owned by vertically integrated operations and while competition is possible 
in the extraction and generation stages, it is not easily done at the transmission and 
distribution parts due to the existing monopolies (Nowak, 2010). Vertically integrated 
operations create many obstacles to potential competitors which include among others 
(Jones, 2004):  
 Setting technical barriers for instance by having expensive procedures for 
customers who want to change suppliers. 
 Market manipulation through access to private information such as contract 
tariffs. 
 Limiting the available lines so that competitors cannot enter the market. 
 Through accounting techniques, they use subsidies in transmission/distribution 
stages initially directed to generation. 
A single market would be one of the possible solutions for securing energy 
systems and enjoying the benefits of competition for investment and industrial 
competitiveness (European Commission, 2010). The energy transition in the EU will 
be hindered if unfair competition is in place and Member States continue to provide 
fossil fuel subsidies and tax reliefs for certain companies (European Commission, 
2017). 
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Nevertheless, ideological differences between the governments of the member 
states combined with severe economic inequality resulted in a less integrated and 
decelerated European energy market, with multiple trading markets arising in many 
regions operating under different trading rules and market conditions. Obviously 
energy market competition and concentration are prominent issues and this may be 
revealed by the way firms compensate their dedicated employees in such efforts.  
Michaelides et al. (2019) consider the effect of market competition on CEO 
compensation analyzing a sample of American firms of the energy sector for the time 
period 1992-2015. Market competition is measured by means of the Herfindhal-
Hirschman-Index and industries are divided into small, medium and high market 
concentration while the effect of the recent financial crisis is taken into consideration. 
CEOs' salaries are affected by firm-level factors like firm size, financial indexes like 
ROA and ROE, market concentration, Tobin's Q but also individual characteristics of 
each CEO such as age, gender, etc. They find a negative and statistically significant 
impact of market concentration index in the US energy sector on CEO compensation 
for firms operating in either a monopolistic or a purely competitive environment.  
3. Main issues arising around competition in the energy sector 
As mentioned some current issues around competition in the energy sector are 
going to be considered like innovation, energy law and the role of Asian markets.  
3.1  Competition and innovation 
Innovation in the energy sector is quite different in relation to other sectors of 
the economy due to market failures, as indivisibility, spillover effects and uncertainty 
are more noticeable here (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; Costa-Campi et al., 2015). 
Moreover the fact that the energy sector is highly linked to the environment, explains 
why greater positive externalities are noticed as well (Salies, 2010; Kim et al., 2012).  
There are two main categories for policies related to the R&D sector (Fabrizio 
et al., 2017): 
 Supply-push: aiming to increase the supply of a particular technology including 
subsidies, tax credits and financial support for personnel. 
 Demand-pull: includes instructed purchases, minimum purchases requirements 
and targeted subsidies.  
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Fabrizio et al. (2017) examine the impact of these two policies on domestic 
innovation and foreign-invented technologies and conclude that the transfer of those 
technologies increase with demand-pull policies. In addition considering a dynamic 
innovation on the European energy industry, it is found that feed in tariffs and 
certificate markets should be used as complementary regulatory instruments from the 
production to consumption stages (Midttun and Gautesen, 2007). Moreover the stages 
of the product cycle should be taken into account regarding policy/regulatory design 
and create different instruments at each stage to achieve greater results (Midttun and 
Gautesen, 2007). In relation to that Hulshof et al. (2016) identify that effective policy 
measures are affected by the capacity allocation mechanisms and investments in 
cross-border capacity.  Finally, Balke and Brown (2018) model U.S. and rest of world 
oil demand and production estimating the elasticity of U.S. GDP to oil price changes 
due to oil supply shock. They conclude that reduced U.S. oil use lowers the sensitivity 
of GDP to oil supply shocks.  
In connection with the above, energy demand could be regulated for instance 
through energy labelling, specific product standards and emission reduction measures, 
but this area faces many difficulties mainly due to lack of coordination (Cairney et al., 
2019). Overall lack of competition in the energy supply market, leads to consumers 
paying a higher price for their energy use. The average energy bill in the UK has risen 
dramatically in 2010 compared to 2004 levels. With more competition profit and 
operations’ costs of energy suppliers are kept as low as possible when considering the 
average consumer bill (Platt, 2012).  
Policy makers should actively encourage a broader ‘ecosystem’ of businesses 
in emerging energy sectors such as energy services, renewable generation, smart grids 
and metering which will enable them to create more efficient and competitive markets 
for the benefit of consumers while creating the potential for innovation and industrial 
growth (Platt, 2012).  
The main drivers affecting policy adoption include: policy characteristics, 
environmental conditions, economic resources and political constraints and 
opportunities; above all factors politics and political culture play a bigger part 
regarding energy and climate change policies (Brown and Huntington, 2008;  
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Matisoff and Edwards, 2014). Moreover the role and interaction of user and producer 
knowledge seems to be highly relevant in this field.  
Cheng et al. (2019) analyze the determinants of changes in electricity 
generation intensity in China revealing the reasons for the differentiations in 
electricity generation intensity in thermal and sustainable power sectors. They show 
that changes in electricity generation intensity are attributed to five effects: the role of 
generation structure, generation-to-consumption ratio and production consumption, 
residential consumption and consumption loss intensities. Electricity consumption 
intensity effect dominates the other effects. The impact of production electricity 
consumption intensity in thermal power sector surpasses its effect in sustainable 
power sector and the differences between changes in electricity generation intensity in 
these sectors are mainly due to differences in production electricity consumption 
intensity with  the search for innovation being emerging.  
In a dynamic framework, Kyritsis and Andersson (2019) explore the 
relationships between crude oil price returns and various energy price returns (diesel, 
gasoline, heating, and natural gas). Using Granger non-causality tests for US spot 
closing prices from January 1997 to December 2017 they concentrate on different 
ranges of the full conditional distribution of a dynamic quantile regression model 
recognizing the quantile ranges where causality arises. This leads to interesting one-
directional dynamic relations between employed energy prices, but also a bi-
directional causal relation between energy prices for which empirical findings 
suggests otherwise.  
Heiskanen and Lovio (2010) apply interaction frameworks in Finland to 
examine such case and find that user involvement can accelerate the acceptance of 
low-energy solutions according to specific methods for every industry. An important 
low-energy solution regarding innovation and competition has to do with renewable 
energy. Charakopoulos  et al. (2019) consider wind power as an important element 
with progressively more contribution in developing economies and many 
environmental benefits. As wind power is substantially dependent on wind velocity 
the identification of patterns in wind velocity is a main concern for the renewable 
energy market. The dynamic characteristics and patterns are explored relying on 
Recurrence Plots (RPs) and Complex Network analysis. In this way useful 
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information may be provide in such analyses which can identify and discover 
dynamical transitions in the system's behaviour revealing information about changes 
and predicting the produced wind energy helping wind site assessment selection.  
The spatial planning optimization to identify suitable locations for installing 
wind farms is a very serious and difficult problem due to the requirement of 
identifying various qualitative and quantitative parameters. Ioannou  et al. (2019) 
incorporate the social factors affecting wind farm investments and propose a 
methodology easily modifiable and replicable by researchers with the ability to create 
and study scenarios. At the same time there is capability to adjust the resolution and 
the accuracy of the location selection. Specifically, a methodology which combines a 
Multi Criteria Decision Making Methods (MCDM) methodology called Analytical 
Hierarch Process (AHP) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to establish 
suitable places for installing wind farms. Planned locations are ranked on installation 
suitability using the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS). This proposed methodology may assist decision makers to cope with 
conflicting parameters recommending the most favourable economical and 
environmental friendly solutions acceptable by citizens and stakeholders. 
Initially competition measures may not be in favour of renewable energy but 
in the longterm these measures would provide a healthier growth to renewables 
(Painuly, 2001). Johnstone et al. (2010) conducted a panel data analysis for 25 
countries for the period 1978-2003 and identify that diverse policy instruments may 
prove effective for different renewable sources with tradeable energy certificates more 
likely to bring on innovation.  
Subsidies such as feed-in-tarriffs may prove valuable for more costly 
renewable sources such as solar power (Johnstone et al., 2010). In addition to that 
Nicolli and Vona (2019) identify that energy liberalization increases public support 
for renewable energy and also a reduction in the monopolistic power of state-owned 
utilities has a positive effect on renewable energy policies. Overall more competition 
would reduce the financial burden of renewable schemes and help achieve the set 
renewables’ use targets (Szabó and Jäger-Waldau, 2008).  
In relation to innovation in the sector, smart grids are widely promoted in the 
EU and worldwide. These can be defined twofold, first they are defined as “electricity 
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networks that can intelligently integrate the behaviour and actions of all users 
connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently 
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies” (Clastres, 2011). 
Another definition is that a smart grid must integrate the characteristics or deliver the 
performance described below: “self-healing from power disturbance events; enabling 
active participation by consumers in demand response; operating resiliently against 
physical and cyber-attack; providing power quality for 21st century needs; 
accommodating all generation and storage options; enabling new products, services, 
and markets; optimizing assets and operating efficiently” (Clastres, 2011).  
 With smart grids Member States can achieve targets in relation to the 
promotion of competition, safety of energy systems and combating climate change. 
Real-time data that will be provided by smart grids will create new market conditions 
for generators and consumers. Many European countries (France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK) have established firm targets for smart grid 
development (Clastres, 2011). It is forecasted that smart grids will be deployed 
nationwide by 2020 (Faruqui et al., 2010).  
3.2  Developments in the European energy market legislation  
 There are several motives for developed economies globally to proceed to 
structural reforms and liberalization of their energy markets. Such strategic decisions 
are mainly driven by economic incentives and the rising benefits from the 
introduction of market competition, however there could also be geopolitical and 
environmental reasons that lead governments towards structural changes of their 
energy market policies. Specifically, in the case of the European Union the 
implemented energy market reform has a broader perspective and meaning than 
simple economic concerns, as it is part of the general strategic planning for real 
political and market unification of the participating member states.   
 In general, the opening of energy market to competition requires several key 
measures that aim to restructure the supply conditions of specific energy sectors such 
as electricity and gas increasing competition, while it often includes the establishment 
of an independent regulatory authority. The purpose of such policy changes lies in the 
fact that competition enhances innovation and cost efficiency leading price reduction 
for both household and industrial consumers. State energy models in the European 
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region involving national monopolies or oligopolies, as well as limited market 
coupling, network connectivity and price convergence made urgent for the European 
commission to act and develop a paneuropean energy policy that would reverse these 
dominating trends within the union.  
 In an attempt to deal with all the above energy market deficiencies the 
European Commission developed a strategic policy for a unified European energy 
market. The concept of an internal energy market was established in order to drive the 
process towards a single electricity and gas market free of restraints that would 
activate European power and gas firms to expand into several member countries 
boosting competition and create a better market environment that would attract 
foreign investments.  
Specifically, during the past few decades the European Commission put a 
great deal of effort through establishing the appropriate legal framework and policies 
to promote diversification and flexibility in the European energy market. The EU has 
enhanced its energy laws with greater extraterritorial power in order to improve its 
relations with neighbouring regions (Samkharadze, 2019). Article 194 of the Treaty 
on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) outlines the key EU energy policy 
objectives under three main policy principles: competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability. In addition the EU has bilateral agreements with third countries (i.e., 
Free Trade Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association 
Agreements) (Samkharadze, 2019).  
Specifically, the EU has focused on its competition policy with the first 
liberalization directives established in 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (gas) and the 
second liberalization directives adopted in 2003 (European Commission, 2012). These 
policies make sure that companies having a fair competition, provide more choices to 
consumers and reduce prices while improving their offered quality (European 
Commission, 2015).  
Moreover in 2009 the ‘third liberalisation package’ was established in the EU 
with stricter regulations on unbundling and the development of new authorities as 
well. Simultaneously the EU Commission investigates breaches of EC Competition 
law. Under this regulation, Member States have to choose between three unbundling 
regimes which include Full Ownership Unbundling, Independent System Operator 
(ISO) and Independent Transmission Operator (ITO); the Commission has a 
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preference for Full Ownership Unbundling as the standard model for guaranteeing the 
independence of network operators (Scholz and Purps, 2010).  
 The two first sets of Directives regarding the electricity and gas markets 
respectively, concentrated in unbundling these two energy sectors and gradual open  
national markets to competition. Particularly the second package of Directives in 2003 
were designed to accomplish the unbundling of transmission and distribution network 
operators from the rest of the industry, the free market entrance of new providers, as 
well as the continuous monitoring of the supply competition level with further 
encouragement of renewable energy sources and reinforcement of the role of 
regulators. Additionally, the third package was endorsed to achieve the goal of a 
unified and functional European energy in which consumers will be enabled to benefit 
from the variety of available providers and the reduced prices. The implementation of 
the third legislative package was expected to intensify competition and strengthen 
market transparency and consumer protection rules.  
 The development and execution of this strategic plan for energy by the 
European Union was from the beginning a rather challenging and ambitious task 
unique in terms of its scale. Jamasb and Polllit (2005) support that the European 
energy market liberalization and unification process constitutes the world’s most 
extensive cross-jurisdiction reform of the kind especially regarding electricity.  
 According to Brown and Huntington (2017) OPEC's market power enlarges its 
share of the marginal barrel of oil and a reduction of world consumption boosts world 
oil security with rising non-OPEC sources of oil augmenting world oil security. Szőke 
et al. (2019) compare the market power of Hungarian electricity traders initially in the 
partially liberalised transitional market model from 2004 to 2008 and then for the 
fully liberalised period since 2008. They propose the use of an econometric modelling 
technique relying on asymmetric price transmission (APT) theory for analysing the 
competition on electricity markets. In this way they measure  the market power of 
traders in the electricity market with the asymmetric price transmission assumption 
referring to deviations from perfect competition.  It is shown that different regulation 
regimes lead to different asymmetry patterns in price transmission underlining that 
electricity traders have improved their position since the introduction of the 
liberalised market model. 
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This modernized and more liberal energy market offered energy providers 
across the European Union the opportunity to negotiate their energy sale contracts 
under better conditions and with an increased competitiveness, due to a variety of 
available options relative to supply routes and the access to millions of households 
and businesses around the globe.  
Nguyen et al. (2019) explore energy transition, energy poverty and energy 
inequality in Vietnam using data on residential energy expenditure of more than 9,000 
households for 2004 - 2016. They realize a transition from traditional to modern 
energy which varies across regions and among ethnic and welfare groups and rural 
and urban population. Electricity poverty has been reduced while energy-cost poverty 
has increased and there is a trend for energy inequality to be reduced at a higher rate 
compared to income and consumption inequalities. This is justified as they suggest a 
national program to alleviate energy poverty by setting up policies to lower 
households' energy costs and helping poor and ethnic minority households to have 
enough money for access to the necessary electricity consumption. 
Similarly, Athukorala et al. (2019) consider residential demand for electricity 
in Sri Lanka using survey data for 2011 and 2015. They realize that the main demand 
determinants for residential electricity are the outcome of price or market distortions 
(i.e. subsidies), various socioeconomic variables and energy saving technology. The 
consequences of these variables are predominantly related to competition policy. 
Various elasticities with respect to average price, subsidies under marginal cost 
pricing, subsidies under average cost pricing and income are calculated showing that 
electricity demand is inelastic and categorised as normal good. But elasticities with 
respect to subsidy variables are found higher than the price variable implying that 
under an increasing block rate system any applied price change to control electricity 
consumption will be ineffective. This is justified as price changes could modify 
received subsidies by  consumers and overturn the objective of price change. Even 
more, they find that price and elasticities for subsidy variables are comparatively 
superior for low income groups while income elasticity is reasonably larger for high 
income groups.  
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3.3 The role of Asian markets 
Asian markets have been driving the trends in world energy markets, whereas 
the gap between consumption and production levels in Asia expands, thus creating 
energy insecurity and hindering economic growth (Chanlett-Avery, 2008). China’s 
growth as an energy consumer is quite spectacular as in 2003, it surpassed Japan to 
become the world’s second largest oil consumer after the United States (US) and is 
now the world’s fifth largest importer of oil (Tow, 2007). China has implemented a 
state-centered approach towards energy security and massively invested in oil fields 
and pipelines worldwide (Zhao, 2008). The country’s need to diversify has created 
closer relationships with Central Asia, the Middle East and the oil producing countries 
of Africa and Latin America (Kenny, 2010).  
Regarding its relationships with other neighbouring countries, with some new 
opportunity for cooperation have arisen, while with others conflicts have occurred 
(i.e. regarding maritime territories) (Zhao, 2008; Kenny, 2010). These trends 
undoubtedly affect US and EU policy. The price variations due to China’s increasing 
demand may create power struggle to secure access to energy resources (Chanlett-
Avery, 2008). Moreover energy cooperation in Northeast Asia has become essential 
for energy supplies and preventing potential conflicts, focusing more on the aspect of 
public goods (Lee, 2010). 
What is more Russia’s relationship with the rest of the world and especially 
neighbouring countries needs to be taken into account. As it stands there is a clear 
asymmetry in the relationship between the EU, US and Russia with national 
monopoly on the supply side (Russia) and open competitive markets on the other. 
Europe is inevitably dependent on Russia for gas but this dependence is not enough to 
succumb to monopolistic approaches (Milov, 2006). Overall Russia has the ability to 
move fast in establishing bilateral energy agreements in countries such as Croatia, 
Serbia and Bulgaria which in turn creates obstacles to US efforts to promote EU 
import diversity and challenge Russia’s influence in Eastern European countries 
especially (Smith, 2010).  
EU and US also collaborate with each other especially for gas imports from 
Ukraine (70% of Europe’s gas originating from there) to avoid a pipeline shutoff of 
gas to Europe from Russia; so far though little has been achieved mainly due to 
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Ukraine’s economic and political situation (Smith, 2010). Stronger enforcement of 
EU competition rules will bring on changes in Russia too as the expansion of 
companies like Gazprom will be limited and monopolies will disappear; at the same 
time downstream mergers and acquisitions, mostly desired by Russia, will decrease 
(Milov, 2006).  
In these lines, Talipova et al. (2019) examine the dramatically changing 
competition landscape of the Russian natural gas industry highlighting the risks for 
independent gas producers associated with replacing price floor with gas exchange 
benchmark. With high EU prices, the state-owned monopolist Gazprom lost half of 
the domestic market but the situation changed in 2014 with oil price reduction and 
Gazprom renewed its interest to domestic market having its lowest bid price 
regulated. Having other producers offering discounts since September 2014 gas 
exchange is promoted by the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) as efficient market 
and valuable part of deregulation strategy. In 2016 FAS recommended to drop 
minimum selling price for Gazprom in July 2019, aiming primarily to competition 
and consumer protection.  
4. Conclusion 
 An essential criterion for the development of a liberalized and competitive 
energy market is to make sure that both the industrial and household sectors are fully 
liberalized and open to market competition. Consequently this will create competition 
between energy providers and encourage consumers to demand better pricing. The 
European Union’s strategic plan for an internal energy market and the legal 
framework that was created to develop the necessary market conditions to promote 
this vision definitely laid the foundation towards a unified and more competitive 
European energy market. Nevertheless, the insufficient market reform combined with 
the slow implementation of the three fundamental Directive packages by the 
European member states, may further delay reaching the target of a unified and 
competitive energy market much more than the end of this decade.  
 In order to create a functional energy market and to enhance competition and 
innovation, any market entry barriers and price controls must be removed. 
Additionally, competitive energy markets also require the active participation of 
consumers. This is primarily expressed by the consumers switching rate, which 
mainly relies on the level of difficulty of the switching process, the market 
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information availability, as well as the legal rights and the established mechanisms 
that could motivate consumers to become more active. Consumer engagement puts 
pressure on energy providers and it is a very representative indicator for the 
competitive level in an energy market.  
 In this special issue various findings emerge: 
-   A statistically significant negative effect of market concentration exist in the case 
of the US energy sector on CEO compensation for competitive or monopolistic firms. 
- Different regulation regimes result to different asymmetry patterns in price 
transmission  
-  The impact of production electricity consumption intensity in thermal power sector 
surpasses its effect in sustainable power sector with differences between changes in 
electricity generation intensity due to differences in production electricity 
consumption intensity 
-  The main demand determinants for residential electricity predominantly related to 
competition policy are the result of price or market distortions (in the form of 
subsidies), various socioeconomic variables and energy saving technology. 
-  National programs are proposed to lighten energy poverty setting up policies to 
lower households' energy costs and helping poor and ethnic minority households in 
their necessary electricity consumption 
-  For the relationships between crude oil price and various energy price returns one-
directional dynamic relation between employed energy prices is fount, but on the 
contrary a bi-directional causal relation exists between energy prices.  
- In Russia and for its monopolistic energy firm (Gazprom) a drop in the minimum 
selling price in July 2019 is recommended, aiming primarily to competition and 
consumer protection. 
 Finally, to help policy makers to identify dynamic characteristics and patterns 
Recurrence Plots (RPs) and Complex Network analysis may identify and discover 
dynamical transitions in the system's behaviour revealing information about changes 
and predicting the produced wind energy helping wind site assessment selection. 
Similarly combining a Multi Criteria Decision Making Methods (MCDM) 
methodology called Analytical Hierarch Process (AHP) and Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) may found suitable places for installing wind farms to dealing with 
conflicting parameters and recommending the most favourable solutions socially and 
economically.  
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